The graph model for conflict resolution with information-gap uncertainty in preferences.

DOI10.1016/S0096-3003(00)00161-2zbMath1047.91007WikidataQ60552629 ScholiaQ60552629MaRDI QIDQ1855168

Yakov Ben-Haim, Keith William Hipel

Publication date: 28 January 2003

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0096-3003(00)00161-2

zbMATH Keywords

preference uncertainty; Cuban missile crisis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A35: Decision theory for games

Related Items

Adaptive Systems Thinking in Integrated Water Resources Management with Insights into Conflicts over Water Exports, Attitudes and preferences: approaches to representing decision maker desires, Inverse engineering preferences in simple games, The graph model for conflict resolution with incomplete fuzzy reciprocal preference relations, Matrix representation of stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution with grey-based preferences, Strength of preference in graph models for multiple-decision-maker conflicts

Cites Work

• Preference modelling
• The decision support system GMCR in environmental conflict management
• Set-models of information-gap uncertainty: Axioms and an inference scheme
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