A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00005-2zbMath1032.91026OpenAlexW2019516193MaRDI QIDQ1864819

Andrés Perea

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00005-2

zbMATH Keywords

rationalityrationalizabilityextensive form gamedeviation propertyupdating system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

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Cites Work

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• Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium