Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: Mergers among parking lots.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(02)00166-5zbMATH Open1043.62104MaRDI QIDQ1868982FDOQ1868982

Authors: L. M. Froeb, S. Tschantz, Philip S. Crooke 

Publication date: 9 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

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• Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium
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zbMATH Keywords

Capacity constraintsMergerDemand estimationParking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium
• Forecasting new product penetration with flexible substitution patterns
• The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition

Cited In (4)

• Mergers, investments and demand expansion
• Evaluating horizontal mergers in Swedish district courts using plant capacity concepts
• Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium
• Assessing mergers and budget constraint in multiple-unit ICT procurements -- \textit{the cooperation/competition dilemma}

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