Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: Mergers among parking lots.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(02)00166-5MaRDI QIDQ1868982zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors L. M. Froeb, S. Tschantz, Philip S. Crooke

Publication date 9 April 2003

Published in Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Capacity constraintsMergerDemand estimationParking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Merger effects in asymmetric and differentiated Bertrand oligopolies
• Upward pricing pressure under capacity constraints, kinked demand and other cases of a constrained pre-merger equilibrium
• ASSESSING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF MERGERS FOR MARKET POWER
• Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium
• Competition in non-linear pricing, market concentration and mergers

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1241609 (Why is no real title available?)
• Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium
• Forecasting new product penetration with flexible substitution patterns
• The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition

Cited in

(4)

• Merger effect of two firms under network equilibrium
• Evaluating horizontal mergers in Swedish district courts using plant capacity concepts
• Mergers, investments and demand expansion
• Assessing mergers and budget constraint in multiple-unit ICT procurements -- \textit{the cooperation/competition dilemma}

This page was built for publication: Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: Mergers among parking lots.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1868982)