Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1876659
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4zbMath1094.91049OpenAlexW4213020422MaRDI QIDQ1876659
Federico Echenique, Jorge A. Oviedo
Publication date: 20 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00184-4
Related Items (35)
A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks ⋮ A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ On the complexity of an expanded Tarski's fixed point problem under the componentwise ordering ⋮ Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets ⋮ A top dog tale with preference complementarities ⋮ Stable matchings and fixed points in trading networks: a note ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ The lattice of worker-quasi-stable matchings ⋮ Stable matching: An integer programming approach ⋮ The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts ⋮ Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions ⋮ Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result ⋮ Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Core of coalition formation games and fixed-point methods ⋮ Finding all stable matchings with couples ⋮ Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor ⋮ On Lattice and DA ⋮ Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts ⋮ Equivalences between two matching models: stability ⋮ Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems ⋮ A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms ⋮ Stable schedule matchings ⋮ The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ The lattice of envy-free matchings ⋮ Core of the assignment game via fixed point methods ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems ⋮ Binary operations for the lattice structure in a many-to-many matching model ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Agreement toward stability in matching markets ⋮ Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
This page was built for publication: Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
