Stability of generally efficient situation in finite cooperative games with parametric optimality principle (from Pareto to Nash)
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Publication:1884359
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Cited in
(12)- On stability of Nash equilibrium situations and Pareto optimal situations in finite games
- Some quasiperfect principles of optimality in cooperative games
- Finite cooperative games with a parametric concept of equilibrium under uncertainty conditions
- Generic stability of the weakly Pareto-Nash equilibrium with strategy transformational barriers
- Investigating equilibria stability on the basis of individual optimum principle
- On the stability of a finite cooperative game with the parametric concept of equilibrium (``from Pareto to Nash)
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- Postoptimal analysis of a finite cooperative game
- On stability of an optimal situation in a finite cooperative game with a parametric concept of equilibrium (from lexicographic optimality to Nash equilibrium)
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