NP-completeness in hedonic games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.003zbMath1067.91006MaRDI QIDQ1886742

Coralio Ballester

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

NP-hard; NP-complete; Computational complexity; Coalition formation; Hedonic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

On non-trivial Nash stable partitions in additive hedonic games with symmetric 0/1-utilities, Hedonic coalition formation games: a new stability notion, Nash stability in additively separable hedonic games and community structures, Formation of segregated and integrated groups, The computational complexity of rationalizing behavior, Computational complexity in additive hedonic games, On myopic stability concepts for hedonic games, Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games, Pareto optimality in coalition formation, Two hardness results for core stability in hedonic coalition formation games, Testing substitutability of weak preferences, On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games, COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY

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