Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2003.12.002MaRDI QIDQ1887442zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Feldman

Publication date 26 November 2004

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

Asymmetric informationMonotone likelihood ratio

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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Cites work

• Competitive signalling
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3145638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 41105 (Why is no real title available?)
• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes

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• Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes

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