Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2003.06.025zbMath1066.91014MaRDI QIDQ1887885

Ferenc Forgó, János Fülöp, Mária Prill

Publication date: 22 November 2004

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.06.025

zbMATH Keywords

Game theory; Climate change negotiations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

86A10: Meteorology and atmospheric physics

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Uses Software

• BPMPD
• Excel

Cites Work

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