Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof

DOI10.1007/S001820400168MaRDI QIDQ1889758zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John Hillas, Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen, Jos Potters

Publication date 9 December 2004

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168

zbMATH Keywords

Admissibility of strategiesNash equilibriumStable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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(2)

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