Social norms and random matching games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1893776
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1006zbMath0829.90143MaRDI QIDQ1893776
Andrew Postlewaite, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara
Publication date: 19 July 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1006
91A07: Games with infinitely many players
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
90C40: Markov and semi-Markov decision processes
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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