Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
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Publication:1896676
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1032zbMath0831.90001MaRDI QIDQ1896676
Thomas R. Palfrey, Peter Cramton
Publication date: 18 February 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers1995-1999/95geb-ratifiable-mechanisms.pdf
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