A folk theorem for stochastic games
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Publication:1897305
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1030zbMath0835.90139MaRDI QIDQ1897305
Publication date: 15 April 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs41000.pdf
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