Rivalrous benefit taxation: The independent viability of separate agencies or firms

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1031zbMATH Open0830.90013OpenAlexW2011031410MaRDI QIDQ1897307FDOQ1897307

Authors: Aaron S. Edlin, Mario Epelbaum 

Publication date: 27 August 1995

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1zb7p2ws

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zbMATH Keywords

complementaritysubstitutabilitytwo-part tariffsfirms with increasing returnsindependent viabilityregulated natural monopolies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (1)

• Two-part marginal cost pricing in a pure fixed cost economy

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