Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall
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Publication:1897339
DOI10.1007/BF01240038zbMath0831.90134MaRDI QIDQ1897339
Mamoru Kaneko, Jeffrey Jude Kline
Publication date: 18 February 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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