Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall

DOI10.1007/BF01240038zbMATH Open0831.90134MaRDI QIDQ1897339FDOQ1897339

Authors: Mamoru Kaneko, J. Kline 

Publication date: 18 February 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3970561

zbMATH Keywords

additional information strategiesperfect recall refinement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Some types of derivations and their applications to field theory
• Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (3)

• Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
• Minimum memory for equivalence between \textit{ex ante} optimality and time-consistency
• On Imperfect Recall in Multi-Agent Influence Diagrams

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