Automata, repeated games and noise
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Publication:1899105
DOI10.1007/BF00184645zbMath0837.90140MaRDI QIDQ1899105
Martin A. Nowak, Esam El-Sedy, Karl Sigmund
Publication date: 13 May 1996
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00184645
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
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