Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment
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Publication:1906454
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1050zbMath0843.90027OpenAlexW2040682221MaRDI QIDQ1906454
Publication date: 19 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/898eb7f6a87fa2c70418e07fcb4a5e112197430f
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