Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0022MaRDI QIDQ1915705zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andreas Blume

Publication date 5 August 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0022

zbMATH Keywords

partially separating equilibriaperturbed gamesperturbed message persistentsender-receiver games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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Cited in

(10)

• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
• A note on pre-play communication
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Meaning in communication games

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