A communication-proof equilibrium concept

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0013zbMATH Open0849.90133OpenAlexW2030693802MaRDI QIDQ1916293FDOQ1916293

Authors: José Luis Ferreira 

Publication date: 3 July 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5132

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zbMATH Keywords

communication-proof equilibriumequilibrium concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (7)

• Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
• Endogeneous formation of coalitions in noncooperative games
• Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria under capacity constraints
• Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games
• On communication and the weak sequential core
• Strategic incentives for keeping one set of books under the arm's length principle

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