Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.096zbMATH Open1253.91115OpenAlexW2026482387MaRDI QIDQ1925642FDOQ1925642

Luca Lambertini, Alessandro Tampieri

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/4490/1/WP750.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous timingproduct qualitysequential play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Monopoly and product quality
• Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Price competition, quality and income disparities
• On the social desirability of patents for sequential innovations in a vertically differentiated market
• Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

Cited In (3)

• The outsourcing conundrum: Misappropriation of intellectual property in supply chains
• ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION
• Time-cost substitutability, earlycutting threat, and innovation timing

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