Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.096MaRDI QIDQ1925642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luca Lambertini, Alessandro Tampieri

Publication date 18 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://amsacta.unibo.it/4490/1/WP750.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous timingproduct qualitysequential play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition
• Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation
• Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly
• Duopoly models with vertical product differentiation
• Quality competition and threat of entry in duopoly

Cites work

• Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Monopoly and product quality
• On the social desirability of patents for sequential innovations in a vertically differentiated market
• Price competition, quality and income disparities
• Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication

Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition
• The outsourcing conundrum: Misappropriation of intellectual property in supply chains
• Time-cost substitutability, earlycutting threat, and innovation timing

This page was built for publication: Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1925642)