Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context
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Publication:1925911
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.043zbMath1254.91493OpenAlexW2091448423MaRDI QIDQ1925911
Francesco Menoncin, Rosella Levaggi
Publication date: 27 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.043
Related Items (2)
Dynamic tax evasion with audits based on visible consumption ⋮ Tax evasion and uncertainty in a dynamic context
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