The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.033zbMATH Open1254.91050OpenAlexW3122523023MaRDI QIDQ1925916FDOQ1925916

Authors: Philipp Schliffke 

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.033

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zbMATH Keywords

reciprocityefficiency wagesgift-exchangeindirect evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Fairness and Contract Design
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A theory of reciprocity
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
• COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES

Cited In (5)

• Efficiency wages with motivated agents
• Students, temporary workers and co-op workers: an experimental investigation on social preferences
• Workers' behavior and labor contract: an evolutionary approach
• Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity
• Industrial fatigue redux

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