Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00038-7MaRDI QIDQ1927320zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph E. jun. Harrington

Publication date 1 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00038-7

zbMATH Keywords

antitrustcartel detectioncollusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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(9)

• Cartel pricing dynamics with reference-dependent preferences
• Antitrust issues in international comparisons of market structure
• Measuring benchmark damages in antitrust litigation: extensions and practical implications
• The marginal price effects of antitrust rules against price discrimination
• Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting
• Passing-on in cartel damages action: an agent-based model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860824 (Why is no real title available?)
• Competitive prices as optimal cartel prices
• Analysis of current penalty schemes for violations of antitrust laws

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