Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.07.004MaRDI QIDQ1928720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francisco Candel-Sánchez

Publication date 3 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

externalitiesimplementationthreshold effects

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
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• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

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(5)

• Environmental policy for spatial and persistent pollutants
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• Apportioning indivisible damage and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology
• The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution
• Optimal management of durable pollution

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