Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: non-commitment as a strategic tool

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035zbMath1255.91164OpenAlexW2031304206MaRDI QIDQ1934017

David McAdams

Publication date: 28 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.08.035

zbMATH Keywords

uniform-price auctionadjustable supply

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence ⋮ Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions ⋮ Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism ⋮ Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation ⋮ Price instability in multi-unit auctions ⋮ On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding ⋮ Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule ⋮ First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts ⋮ Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions ⋮ Uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders

Cites Work

• The multiple unit auction with variable supply
• Erratum to ``The uniform price auction with endogenous supply
• Auctions of Shares
• Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply

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