Adjustable supply in uniform price auctions: non-commitment as a strategic tool
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Recommendations
- Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
- Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
- The multiple unit auction with variable supply
- The uniform price auction with endogenous supply
- Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
Cites work
Cited in
(10)- Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions
- Price instability in multi-unit auctions
- Uniform price auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
- Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule
- First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts
- Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism
- Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
- On the properties of equilibria in private value divisible good auctions with constrained bidding
- Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
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