Risk aversion, mandatory disclosure and the concealment of information
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Recommendations
- Risk aversion, public disclosure, and long-lived information
- INSIDER TRADING AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
- Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades
- Asset markets with insider trading disclosure rule and reselling constraint: an experimental analysis
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
Cites work
Cited in
(13)- Risk aversion, public disclosure, and long-lived information
- Mandatory disclosure and financial contagion
- Why do managers disclose risks accurately? Textual analysis, disclosures, and risk exposures
- Mandatory disclosure, investment, and private benefits of control
- Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection
- Asset markets with insider trading disclosure rule and reselling constraint: an experimental analysis
- Mandatory disclosure tone and bank risk-taking: evidence from Europe
- When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
- Guiding the guiders: Foundations of a market-driven theory of disclosure
- Regulatory certification, risk factor disclosure, and investor behavior
- Effectiveness of mandatory disclosure for consumer policy
- The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy
- Risk disclosure and firm operational efficiency
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