Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case with transferable utility

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2007.10.014MaRDI QIDQ1934823zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommitmentrevelation principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility

Cited in

(6)

• Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case
• Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
• On the cardinality of the message space in sender-receiver games
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Revelation in informational dynamic settings

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