On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: type of externality and timing of policymaking

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.01.001MaRDI QIDQ1934858zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emilson C. D. Silva, Xie Zhu

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

carbon dioxidedecentralized leadershipemissions tradingenvironmental externalityPareto efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
• Who should abate carbon emissions? An international viewpoint

Cited in

(4)

• The zero-emission certificates: A novel CO\(_{2}\)-pollution reduction instrument applied to the electricity market.
• An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
• A theoretical inefficiency in the international marketing of tradable global warming emission permits
• Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding

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