Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games
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Publication:1937893
DOI10.1007/s00285-012-0516-yzbMath1259.91024WikidataQ51419850 ScholiaQ51419850MaRDI QIDQ1937893
Honglin Yang, Zhanwen Ding, Shuxun Wang
Publication date: 1 February 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-012-0516-y
replicator dynamics; evolutionarily stable strategy; matrix game; local superiority; global superiority; invader strategy
91A22: Evolutionary games
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