Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
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Publication:1944865
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0129-3zbMath1260.91103MaRDI QIDQ1944865
Christer Andersson, Tommy Andersson, Ola Andersson
Publication date: 28 March 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0129-3
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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