Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.015zbMath1275.91087MaRDI QIDQ1945831

Takashi Kunimoto, Georgy Artemov, Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 17 April 2013

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002

zbMATH Keywords

measurability; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; \(\Delta \)-rationalizability; robust virtual implementation; type diversity; Wilson doctrine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B44: Economics of information

91B14: Social choice

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