Information design in competitive insurance markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105160MaRDI QIDQ1995307zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105160

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming
• Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
• Optimal insurance with adverse selection
• Competitive insurance pricing with complete information, loss-averse utility and finitely many policies
• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection

Cites work

• Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
• Informational Equilibrium
• Matching to share risk
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance

Cited in

(8)

• REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
• Private information and insurance rejections
• The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
• Product design in selection markets
• Nonmanipulatable insurance mechanisms: a design method
• Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
• Price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information

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