Information design in competitive insurance markets
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Publication:1995307
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105160zbMATH Open1460.91222OpenAlexW3101988914MaRDI QIDQ1995307FDOQ1995307
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105160
Recommendations
- Insurance, adverse selection, and cream-skimming
- Incentive efficient price systems in large insurance economies with adverse selection
- Optimal insurance with adverse selection
- Competitive insurance pricing with complete information, loss-averse utility and finitely many policies
- Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
Cites Work
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- Informational Equilibrium
- On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
- Matching to share risk
- The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
- Equilibria in health exchanges: adverse selection versus reclassification risk
Cited In (8)
- The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
- Price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information
- Private information and insurance rejections
- Nonmanipulatable insurance mechanisms: a design method
- Product design in selection markets
- Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets
- Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection
- REGULATING INSURANCE MARKETS: MULTIPLE CONTRACTING AND ADVERSE SELECTION
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