Information design in competitive insurance markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105160zbMATH Open1460.91222OpenAlexW3101988914MaRDI QIDQ1995307FDOQ1995307

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105160

Recommendations

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• Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectioninsurance marketsinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
• Informational Equilibrium
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Matching to share risk
• The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
• Equilibria in Health Exchanges: Adverse Selection versus Reclassification Risk

Cited In (4)

• The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making
• Private information and insurance rejections
• Nonmanipulatable insurance mechanisms: a design method
• Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets

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