Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
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Publication:1995471
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.002zbMath1458.91101OpenAlexW3117063603MaRDI QIDQ1995471
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.002
Cites Work
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