Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.12.002zbMATH Open1458.91101OpenAlexW3117063603MaRDI QIDQ1995471FDOQ1995471

Gagan Ghosh

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

simultaneous auctionsbetter-reply securitymulti-dimensional typesprivate budgets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Colonel Blotto game
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• Competition for a Majority
• Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
• Multiple-Object, Discriminatory Auctions with Bidding Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions
• High bids and broke winners
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
• Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction
• Contests with limited resources
• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• The two notes of the Blotto game
• Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
• Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents
• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints
• Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
• TWO-OBJECT TWO-BIDDER SIMULTANEOUS AUCTIONS

Cited In (3)

• Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Approximately Efficient Double Auctions with Strong Budget Balance

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