Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_4MaRDI QIDQ2008298zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, Artem A. Sedakov, Elena M. Parilina

Publication date 25 November 2019

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23699-1_4

zbMATH Keywords

average tree solutioncentrality rewarding Shapley and Myerson valuescommunication graphgraph formationMyerson valuesubgame perfect equilibriumTU game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Link formation in cooperative situations.
• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• On the stability of cooperation structures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841910
• Potential maximizers and network formation

Cited in

(7)

• Endogenous formation of cooperation structures
• Link formation in cooperative situations.
• On benefits of cooperation under strategic power
• Solutions of cooperative games with a major player and a hierarchical structure
• On the stability of cooperation structures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841910 (Why is no real title available?)
• Endogenous network formation in a Tullock contest

This page was built for publication: Endogenous formation of cooperation structure in TU games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2008298)