Dilemmas, coordination and defection: how uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.009zbMATH Open1393.91036OpenAlexW2728728586WikidataQ114174562 ScholiaQ114174562MaRDI QIDQ2013384FDOQ2013384

Authors: Yanyan Li 

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.009

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zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyexperimental economicscommon pool resourcetragedy of the commons

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Discrete/Continuous Models of Consumer Demand
• Common pools resource dilemmas under uncertainty: Qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions
• The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons
• Cooperation in and out of markets: an experimental comparison of public good games and markets with externalities

Cited In (3)

• Common pools resource dilemmas under uncertainty: Qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions
• The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons
• How leaking and overproducing resources affect the evolutionary robustness of cooperative cross-feeding

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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