Certificate transparency with enhancements and short proofs

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Publication:2014630

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_22zbMATH Open1420.94096arXiv1704.04937OpenAlexW2605897802MaRDI QIDQ2014630FDOQ2014630


Authors: Abhishek Singh, Binanda Sengupta, Sushmita Ruj Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 25 August 2017

Abstract: Browsers can detect malicious websites that are provisioned with forged or fake TLS/SSL certificates. However, they are not so good at detecting malicious websites if they are provisioned with mistakenly issued certificates or certificates that have been issued by a compromised certificate authority. Google proposed certificate transparency which is an open framework to monitor and audit certificates in real time. Thereafter, a few other certificate transparency schemes have been proposed which can even handle revocation. All currently known constructions use Merkle hash trees and have proof size logarithmic in the number of certificates/domain owners. We present a new certificate transparency scheme with short (constant size) proofs. Our construction makes use of dynamic bilinear-map accumulators. The scheme has many desirable properties like efficient revocation, low verification cost and update costs comparable to the existing schemes. We provide proofs of security and evaluate the performance of our scheme.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.04937




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