If nudge cannot be applied: a litmus test of the readers' stance on paternalism

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9375-2MaRDI QIDQ2015038zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chen Li, Zhihua Li, Peter P. Wakker

Publication date 18 June 2014

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9375-2

zbMATH Keywords

debiasinglibertarian paternalismchoice inconsistencynudgestandard gamble

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3276288 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Multiperson utility
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• The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
• The ratio bias phenomenon: fact or artifact?
• The shape of incomplete preferences
• Using a Bayesian approach to quantify scale compatibility bias
• Why we should not be silent about noise

Cited in

(2)

• Old wine in new casks: libertarian paternalism still violates liberal principles
• Decision sciences and the new case for paternalism: three welfare-related justificatory challenges

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