Manipulating games by sharing information

DOI10.1007/S11225-014-9544-5zbMATH Open1329.91007OpenAlexW1976853346MaRDI QIDQ2016078FDOQ2016078

M. J. Wooldridge, John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Inon Zuckerman

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-014-9544-5

zbMATH Keywords

communicationNash equilibriumBoolean gamesannouncement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Classical propositional logic (03B05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• STRIPS: A new approach to the application of theorem proving to problem solving
• Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Knowledge Puzzles
• An axiomatic basis for computer programming
• Incentive engineering for Boolean games
• Dependencies between players in Boolean games
• The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games

Cited In (3)

• Manipulation in Games
• From model checking to equilibrium checking: reactive modules for rational verification
• Incentive-based search for equilibria in Boolean games

This page was built for publication: Manipulating games by sharing information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2016078)