Incentives and group identity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.013zbMATH Open1296.91077OpenAlexW2009320797MaRDI QIDQ2016214FDOQ2016214

Authors: Paolo Masella, Stephan Meier, Philipp Zahn 

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62419

Recommendations

• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
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zbMATH Keywords

trustexperimentincentivessocial preferencesmotivationcrowding outsocial identity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Fairness and Contract Design
• Discrimination in a segmented society: an experimental approach.
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories

Cited In (6)

• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Self-designation and group allocation
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
• Another hidden cost of incentives: the detrimental effect on norm enforcement
• Self-control in peer groups
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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