Incentives and group identity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.013MaRDI QIDQ2016214zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Masella, Stephan Meier, Philipp Zahn

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62419

zbMATH Keywords

trustexperimentincentivessocial preferencesmotivationcrowding outsocial identity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
• The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)

Cites work

• Discrimination in a segmented society: an experimental approach.
• Does monitoring decrease work effort? The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories
• Fairness and Contract Design

Cited in

(6)

• Self-designation and group allocation
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Unequal incentives and perceived fairness in groups
• Another hidden cost of incentives: the detrimental effect on norm enforcement
• Self-control in peer groups
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• ORSEE
• Z-Tree

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