Repeated games simulating exchange auction and recursive sequences

DOI10.1134/S1064230709040145zbMATH Open1308.91067OpenAlexW2095570011MaRDI QIDQ2017538FDOQ2017538

Authors: Victoria L. Kreps 

Publication date: 23 March 2015

Published in: Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064230709040145

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
• On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance
• Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets

Cited In (4)

• In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945--3 March 2021)
• Bidding models and repeated games with incomplete information: a survey
• A multistage exchange trading model with asymmetric information and elements of bargaining
• Repeated Bidding Games with Incomplete Information and Bounded Values: On the Exponential Speed of Convergence

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