Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.12.001MaRDI QIDQ2019362zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Beth Novick, F. R. McMorris, Henry Martyn Mulder, Robert C. Powers

Publication date 26 April 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

consistencymajority rulemajority with biaspartial anonymity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A characterization of simple majority rule for restricted domains
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• A new characterization of the majority rule
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• An axiomatic characterization of some locations in trees
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
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• Collective approval
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• Consistency of decision processes
• Five axioms for location functions on median graphs
• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limits of acyclic voting
• Monotonicity + efficiency + continuity = majority
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• The majority strategy on graphs
• The median function on median graphs and semilattices
• The median procedure on median graphs
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Cited in

(3)

• Beyond neutrality: extended difference of votes rules
• Breaking ties in collective decision-making
• Variable-population voting rules

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