National security vs. human rights: a game theoretic analysis of the tension between these objectives
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Publication:2029404
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Cites work
- Civil liberties and terrorism in Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan
- Contest success functions
- Endogenizing the sticks and carrots: modeling possible perverse effects of counterterrorism measures
- Espionage and the optimal standard of the customs-trade partnership against terrorism (C-TPAT) program in maritime security
- False targets efficiency in defense strategy
- Fractionalization
- Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game
- Negative Binomial Regression
- On popular response to violence during insurgencies
- Optimal allocation of resources in airport security: profiling vs. screening
- Regression analysis of count data
- Role of intelligence inputs in defending against cyber warfare and cyberterrorism
- The theory of contests: a survey
- Why defeating insurgencies is hard: the effect of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations -- a best-case scenario
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