Level-k reasoning in school choice

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.03.007MaRDI QIDQ2031184zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jun Zhang

Publication date 8 June 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

Boston mechanismdeferred acceptanceheterogeneous sophisticationlevel-k modelschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Manipulability in school choice
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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: an experimental study
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Constrained school choice
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3135430 (Why is no real title available?)
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Obviously strategy-proof implementation of top trading cycles
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• School choice: an experimental study
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match

Cited in

(3)

• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• Nonstandard choice in matching markets

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