Propositions, representation, and truth
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Publication:2052154
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2150328 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068529 (Why is no real title available?)
- Doubt truth to be a liar
- General semantics
- Hyperintensional propositions
- Impossible worlds: A modest approach
- Logic for languages containing referentially promiscuous expressions
- Modal Logic as Metaphysics
- Possible Worlds
- Propositions
- Shifting situations and shaken attitudes
- Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions
- Understanding truth
- Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
Cited in
(14)- A general argument against structured propositions
- Act theories and the attitudes
- On propositions and fineness of grain (again!)
- What propositional structure could not be
- Structured propositions and trivial composition
- Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5995417 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3995089 (Why is no real title available?)
- A theory of propositions
- Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
- Propositions and same-saying: introduction
- Propositions as cognitive acts
- Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
- Unity through truth
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