Propositions, representation, and truth

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1492-YzbMATH Open1474.03021OpenAlexW2738937471MaRDI QIDQ2052154FDOQ2052154

Authors: Geoff Georgi 

Publication date: 25 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1492-y

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zbMATH Keywords

truthpossible worldspropositionsfineness of grain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions
• General semantics
• Modal Logic as Metaphysics
• Impossible worlds: A modest approach
• Understanding truth
• Doubt truth to be a liar
• Possible Worlds
• Logic for languages containing referentially promiscuous expressions
• Propositions
• Hyperintensional propositions
• Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
• Shifting situations and shaken attitudes

Cited In (4)

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• Title not available (Why is that?)

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