Propositions, representation, and truth
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Publication:2052154
DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1492-YzbMATH Open1474.03021OpenAlexW2738937471MaRDI QIDQ2052154FDOQ2052154
Authors: Geoff Georgi 
Publication date: 25 November 2021
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1492-y
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Cites Work
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- Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions
- General semantics
- Modal Logic as Metaphysics
- Impossible worlds: A modest approach
- Understanding truth
- Doubt truth to be a liar
- Possible Worlds
- Logic for languages containing referentially promiscuous expressions
- Propositions
- Hyperintensional propositions
- Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
- Shifting situations and shaken attitudes
Cited In (14)
- Why propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
- Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
- A theory of propositions
- Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions
- A general argument against structured propositions
- Act theories and the attitudes
- On propositions and fineness of grain (again!)
- What propositional structure could not be
- Structured propositions and trivial composition
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Unity through truth
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Propositions and same-saying: introduction
- Propositions as cognitive acts
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