`Ought' implies `can' against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1531-8zbMATH Open1474.03011OpenAlexW2750368526MaRDI QIDQ2052210FDOQ2052210

Authors: Charles Côté-Bouchard 

Publication date: 25 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1531-8

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zbMATH Keywords

beliefepistemic justification`ought' implies `can'doxastic involuntarismepistemic deontologismepistemic normativityepistemic norms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Deontic vs. nondeontic conceptions of epistemic justification

Cited In (2)

• Belief isn't voluntary, but commitment is
• Moral dilemmas, disjunctive obligations, and Kant's principle that ``ought implies ``can

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