Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1630-6MaRDI QIDQ2053989zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Jessica J. Cunningham

Publication date 30 November 2021

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1630-6

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic rationalitybelieving for reasonsnormative reasonsreasons for beliefthe basing relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Recommendations

• The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
• Believing for a reason
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• On the logic of aiming at truth
• Should I believe all the truths?

Cites work

• Believing for a reason

Cited in

(9)

• Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach
• An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
• On the logic of aiming at truth
• Should I believe all the truths?
• The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
• Knowledgeably responding to reasons
• Are epistemic reasons normative?
• Believing for a reason
• On the generality argument for the knowledge norm

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