Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

DOI10.1007/S11229-017-1630-6zbMATH Open1475.03023DBLPjournals/synthese/Cunningham19OpenAlexW2773192330WikidataQ59612491 ScholiaQ59612491MaRDI QIDQ2053989FDOQ2053989

Authors: Jessica J. Cunningham 

Publication date: 30 November 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1630-6

Recommendations

• The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
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zbMATH Keywords

epistemic rationalitybelieving for reasonsnormative reasonsreasons for beliefthe basing relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

• Believing for a reason

Cited In (9)

• Possessing reasons: why the awareness-first approach is better than the knowledge-first approach
• An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning
• On the logic of aiming at truth
• Should I believe all the truths?
• The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
• Knowledgeably responding to reasons
• Are epistemic reasons normative?
• Believing for a reason
• On the generality argument for the knowledge norm

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