On the characterization of saddle point equilibrium for security games with additive utility

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Publication:2056958

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-64793-3_19zbMATH Open1483.91012arXiv2007.14478OpenAlexW3127702144MaRDI QIDQ2056958FDOQ2056958


Authors: Yanyan Li Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 8 December 2021

Abstract: In this work, we investigate a security game between an attacker and a defender, originally proposed in cite{emadi2019security}. As is well known, the combinatorial nature of security games leads to a large cost matrix. Therefore, computing the value and optimal strategy for the players becomes computationally expensive. In this work, we analyze a special class of zero-sum games in which the payoff matrix has a special structure which results from the {it additive property} of the utility function. Based on variational principles, we present structural properties of optimal attacker as well as defender's strategy. We propose a linear-time algorithm to compute the value based on the structural properties, which is an improvement from our previous result in cite{emadi2019security}, especially in the context of large-scale zero-sum games.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14478




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