The Borda count with weak preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110162MaRDI QIDQ2069955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Asen Ivanov

Publication date 21 January 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/247190

zbMATH Keywords

Borda countpreference aggregationweak preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Borda count for partially ordered ballots
• A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition
• A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
• Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II: Positional voting
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(5)

• The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison
• Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
• The Borda majority count
• Borda-optimal taxation of labour income
• Egalitarian random assignment

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