Abstract: A Fragile CPR Game is an instance of a resource sharing game where a common-pool resource, which is prone to failure due to overuse, is shared among several players. Each player has a fixed initial endowment and is faced with the task of investing in the common-pool resource without forcing it to fail. The return from the common-pool resource is subject to uncertainty and is perceived by the players in a prospect-theoretic manner. It is shown in [A.~R.~Hota, S.~Garg, S.~Sundaram, extit{Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes}, Games and Economic Behavior extbf{98} (2016) 135--164.] that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile CPR Game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. In this article we investigate an extended version of a Fragile CPR Game, in which players are allowed to share multiple common-pool resources that are also prone to failure due to overuse. We refer to this game as a Fragile multi-CPR Game. Our main result states that, under some mild assumptions, a Fragile multi-CPR Game admits a Generalized Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that, when there are more players than common-pool resources, the set consisting of all Generalized Nash equilibria of a Fragile multi-CPR Game is of Lebesgue measure zero.
Recommendations
- Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes
- Common pools resource dilemmas under uncertainty: Qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1748687
- Nash equilibrium in a special case of symmetric resource extraction games
- Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games
Cites work
- A continuous knapsack problem with separable convex utilities: approximation algorithms and applications
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Common pools resource dilemmas under uncertainty: Qualitative tests of equilibrium solutions
- Computing all solutions of linear generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- Convexity and optimization in \({\mathbb R^n}\)
- Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy
- Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes
- Generalized Nash equilibrium problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827624 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1218462 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6969558 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3993588 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mathematical foundations of game theory
- Mathematical optimization and economic analysis
- On the solution of multidimensional convex separable continuous knapsack problem with bounded variables
- Projection inequalities for antichains
- Prospect theory. For risk and ambiguity.
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game
- Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
- Submersions and preimages of sets of measure zero
- The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons
This page was built for publication: A fragile multi-CPR game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2074843)
