Impossible individuals as necessarily empty individual concepts

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-53487-5_9OpenAlexW3109442104MaRDI QIDQ2086540FDOQ2086540

Authors: Bjørn Jespersen, Daniela Glavaničová, Marie Duží 

Publication date: 25 October 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53487-5_9

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)

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