Impossible individuals as necessarily empty individual concepts

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-53487-5_9MaRDI QIDQ2086540zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bjørn Jespersen, Daniela Glavaničová, Marie Duží

Publication date 25 October 2022

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53487-5_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)

Recommendations

• Impossible worlds: A modest approach
• The ontology of impossible worlds
• Impossible worlds
• Modal Meinongianism: conceiving the impossible
• Are impossible worlds trivial?

This page was built for publication: Impossible individuals as necessarily empty individual concepts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2086540)