When does centralization undermine adaptation?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2095261
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105533zbMATH Open1504.91078OpenAlexW4292136244WikidataQ114160451 ScholiaQ114160451MaRDI QIDQ2095261FDOQ2095261
Authors: Shuo Liu, Dimitri Migrow
Publication date: 9 November 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105533
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
- Game theory
- Comparing location experiments
- Governing Adaptation1
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Strategic communication with lying costs
- Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
- The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
- Delegating performance evaluation
- Communication and behavior in organizations: an experiment
Cited In (8)
- Optimal Dissent in Organizations
- Technical change and the decentralization penalty
- Random authority
- Governing Adaptation1
- Communication in the shadow of catastrophe
- Language and the theory of the firm
- Communication and behavior in organizations: an experiment
- Random decentralization within multi-divisional organizations
This page was built for publication: When does centralization undermine adaptation?
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2095261)